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Introduction
The development of salmon aquaculture has been very successful, and the industry
has shown growth rates during the last two decades that are hardly matched by any
other industry.  The growth of the industry has mainly been possible because of a
substantial increase in productivity with a consequent reduction in cost of produc-
tion (Asche 1997).  A number of studies has addressed issues regarding the
productivity of salmon farms (Salvanes 1993; Bjørndal and Salvanes 1995; Asche
and Tveterås 1999; Tveterås 1999, 2000, 2002; Kumbhakar 2001, 2002; Guttormsen
2002).  However, all these studies have used Norwegian data. Lack of data for other
producers has prevented formal studies of salmon farming in other producing coun-
tries. Bjørndal (2002) provides a partial exception in that he compares cost data for
Norwegian and Chilean farms and concludes that the cost level is similar, but with
different cost composition.
Norway’s share of farmed salmon production has decreased substantially since
1980, despite the fact that Norwegian production costs have been reduced by more
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than 70% in the same period (Asche, Bjørndal, and Young 2001). Hence, productiv-
ity must have increased substantially among other producers. While lack of data
prevents us from reporting on the specific productivity development among these
producers, we can make deductions about this development over time by investigat-
ing the development in production shares.1
In a free market, changes in production shares will be due to differences in the
productivity development or cost of production. Therefore, a producer with faster
productivity growth than his competitors will increase his market share. In markets
with trade restrictions and regulations, however, the development in production
shares will show the combined effect of trade restrictions, regulations, and the rela-
tive productivity growth. Since there have been a number of regulations and trade
conflicts in the salmon market, we must provide a brief overview of the most impor-
tant ones before we discuss the development in production shares.2
Regulations and International Trade Restrictions
Salmon farming was pioneered in Norway, and the salmon farming industry became
commercially viable in the late 1970s. However, regulations were introduced early
on.  A licence was, and still is, required to operate a farm, the size of farms is regu-
lated, and only one farm per owner was allowed. Ownership regulations led to an
owner-operator industry structure and prevented the formation of large companies
until these restrictions were abolished in November 1992. After pressure from the
EU to help stabilise the European salmon market, periods of feeding stops and feed
quotas were introduced in 1995 and 1996.  The feed quotas have effectively limited
production.3
There have been several trade disputes both in the US and Europe. A dumping
complaint led to the imposition of a countervailing duty of 26%, on average, on
Norwegian salmon exports to the US in April 1991. The duty effectively closed the
US fresh salmon market for Norwegian producers (Anderson 1992; Asche 2001).
Furthermore, it caused a major reallocation of trade patterns as Canada and Chile
took over the Norwegian market share in the US, while Norwegian producers won
market share in Japan. In 1998, US farmers filed a dumping complaint against Chile,
the largest exporter to the US, after the market had been closed to Norway. Chilean
farmers were found guilty, but the duties imposed were lower than the ones against
Norway, and thus had little impact on trade.4
In the EU there have been both formal and informal complaints towards Norwe-
gian salmon producers. Scottish and Irish complaints have led to minimum prices
for a number of periods.5 Dumping complaints have been launched three times
1 A production share is defined as quantity produced by a given producer in tonnes over total global pro-
duction of salmon in that period. The relative prices in the salmon market are constant, and conse-
quently it is possible to construct a global salmon price (Asche, Bremnes, and Wessells 1999). The pro-
duction shares should, therefore, follow the development in market shares if the market shares were con-
structed using a common price index. However, as the price index must be defined relative to a base, we
cannot see that construction of such an index will give any additional information for the present pur-
pose.
2 For more detailed overviews or discussions of specific measures, see Bjørndal (1990), Anderson
(1992), Anderson and Fong (1997), Asche (1997), Asche (2001) and Kinnucan and Myrland (2002).
3 Until November 1992 all Norwegian salmon had to be sold through a sales monopoly (FOS) and there
were a number of other technical measures to fulfil. Technical measures are present to varying extents in
other farming nations.
4 The Chilean duties were 5.19%, on average.
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against Norwegian farmers.6 The first two times Norwegian farmers were found not
guilty, whereas the third time it was clear that the European Commission computed
a dumping margin and, based on this, the EU and Norway entered into the “salmon
agreement” that restricts Norwegian salmon’s access to the EU.7 In 2002, Scottish
and Irish farmers also filed dumping complaints against producers from Chile and
the Faroe Islands.
The Development in Production Shares
In figure 1, we show the production shares of the four largest producers of salmon:
Norway, Chile, the UK, and Canada, which combined represent about 90% of the global
production of farmed salmon. By farmed salmon we mean farmed Atlantic salmon,
coho, and salmon trout.8 The numbers for 2001 are preliminary, and with respect to
Chile there is some uncertainty, as some sources report higher production than what
has been used here. However, this does not change the main picture to any extent.
Several trends dominate the picture.  The first is Norway’s leading but diminish-
ing position throughout the period.  Norway’s market share fell from 70% in 1981 to
40% in 1992.  To some extent, this decline was probably bound to happen due to
diffusion of best-practice production technologies from Norway to other countries.
However, there is no doubt that it was accentuated by Norwegian entry and owner-
ship regulations, as they represented incentives to invest in other countries.  Since
the second half of the 1980s, Norwegian capital has been involved in salmon firms
in virtually all salmon producing countries.  Due to the salmon market crisis around
1990, Norwegian ownership regulations were abandoned.  A restructuring process
then started in Norway as firms merged and larger firms were created, actually in-
creasing Norwegian market share from 1992 to 1995. As a consequence of
anti-dumping allegations from the EU in 1996, new regulations were introduced, in-
cluding feed quotas per farm that effectively limit production.  Ever since, with the
exception of 1999, Norway has been losing market share and ended at a level of
36% in 2001.
The second important trend is the rise of Chile as a major producer of farmed
salmon.  Currently, Chile is the second largest salmon producer, with about 34% of
total production, and it will soon become the largest producer if these trends con-
tinue.  There are relatively few restrictions on salmon farming in Chile.  The cost
level seems to be low compared to other salmon producers, and with many foreign
firms in the industry, Chile shares the same knowledge base. Hence, based on the
development in its production share and other available information, it appears that
Chile’s productivity growth has increased the most during the last decade. However,
there are some major disadvantages for Chile. The first is the lack of infrastructure
in Region XI, where much of the future industry expansion may take place. The sec-
ond  is  the  long  distance  to  markets,  leading  to  high  transportation  costs.
Furthermore, as Chile has become a major producer, it is increasingly targeted in
anti-dumping complaints, first in the US in 1998, and then in the EU in 2002. The
only setback in Chile’s production share was in 1999, which can be attributed partly
to the Asian crisis in 1997–98 that adversely influenced demand in key markets, and
partly to the uncertainty following the US dumping complaint.
6 24 November 1989, 10 November 1991, 19 November 1996.
7 See Kinnucan and Myrland (2002) and references therein for discussions of the “salmon agreement.”
8 Atlantic salmon now makes up more than 80% of total farmed salmon production, while the remaining
share is split between coho and salmon trout (Bjørndal, Knapp, and Lem 2003).Asche, Bjørndal, and Sissener 208
Canada and the UK have in common that they have access to or are located
within two of the main salmon markets, Canada to the US market due to NAFTA,
while the UK is in the EU.  One would think that the Norwegian regulations and
trade problems and the Chilean trade problems should have benefited these produc-
ers. The Canadian industry grew in the 1980s, but its share of production has been
virtually constant during the 1990s. The UK industry was in place fairly early and
has had a relatively stable production share during the two decades. However, it
reached a historic low of about 11% in 2001.  Both the Canadian and UK industries
seem to have experienced a productivity growth that is close to industry average
over the period, but neither producer has been able to benefit from the trade restric-
tions and regulations faced by Norway and Chile.  For Canada, lack of availability
of sites could be an explanation.  For Scotland, it may be due to variables such as
disease problems and the high value of the pound sterling, or to more long-term con-
straints like availability of sites that limit future increases in production.  Both
reasons imply reduced profitability for Scottish farmers.  This is a concern for Chil-
ean and Norwegian farmers, as it provides an incentive for anti-dumping complaints
by Scottish producers.
The four main producers have increased their combined share of production dur-
ing the last decade.  The only smaller producer that grows at a similar pace with the
four major ones is the Faroe Islands. One may wonder what has happened to Japan,
which in the early 1980s was the second largest producer in the world, the US, Aus-
tralia, Ireland, and Iceland.  It appears that regulations and problems with suitable
locations have hindered growth to a large extent, even though production in most of
these countries has been growing in absolute terms. It may also be that the indus-
tries, because of their small size, never realized the external scale effects associated
Figure 1. Production Shares for the Four Main Salmon Producing Countries, 1981–2001
Sources: Bill Atkinson’s News Report; The Norwegian Seafood Export Council.Relative Productivity Development in Salmon Aquaculture 209
with agglomeration that can be associated with a larger industry. Agglomeration ef-
fects have been revealed for Norway (Tveterås 2002), and they are likely to also be
present for the other three main producing countries.
Concluding Remarks
The development in production shares should provide information on the relative
development of productivity. For the salmon aquaculture industry, this relationship
is disturbed by trade restrictions and regulations.  It appears that Norway has had
lower productivity growth than Chile. This has been amplified by Norwegian regula-
tions and the many trade conflicts that Norwegian salmon producers have been
involved in. It is noteworthy that from 1992–95, the period with less binding regula-
tory measures, the Norwegian share actually increased. It is also of interest to note
that after the trade tensions started in the salmon market in the late 1980s, Chile was
the only major producer that won significant production shares from the Norwegian
producers, while both Canada and the UK failed to do so. This occurred in spite of
Chile becoming a target in anti-dumping cases. This is somewhat surprising, as one
would expect trade and other regulatory measures to benefit these producers. It is
then likely that without the additional burden of trade restrictions and regulations in
Norway and Chile, the production shares of Canada and the UK would have been
substantially reduced, as they have had much lower productivity growth than Chile,
and probably also Norway without trade restrictions.  While these measures benefit
producers not facing restrictions, they lead to higher prices and lower production
than what one otherwise would have had. This not only reduces the welfare of con-
sumers, but also the leading role salmon could have played in the world’s seafood
markets. Finally, it increases the possibility for other farmed species to take over as
the world’s leading farmed fish.
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